Abstract
Introduction
In Trust Negotiation, two strange parties can exchange digital credentials that contain some attributes of information for access control. Hidden Credential stems from the paradigm of Trust Negotiation [6, 7, 8] , which guards sensitive resources by attribute-based policies that can be fulfilled by publicly verifiable digital credentials issued by some third party.
Conceptually, a trust negotiation problem is given as follows. Let us denote by Alice and Bob the participants, where Alice is the client and Bob is the server. Bob grants * This work is partially supported by a grant from the Fund of National Natural Science Foundation of China (#60502047), Education Bureau of Fujian Province (#JB05329) access to sensitive resources to his clients who have the correct credentials. Because of the sensitivity, Bob does not want to reveal his policies in order to protect his sensitive resources. Alice has a correct credential, but she doesn't want to disclose her credential to Bob. Some recent works [2, 3, 9] have performed this type of attribute-based access controls for protecting Alice's credentials and Bob's policies [5] . Based on identity-based encryption (IBE) in [1] , it is not hard to achieve hidden credentials.
In hidden credential, Bob encrypts a resource in such a way that Alice can decrypt it if she has the right credentials [2] , where the encryption key is Bob's policy and the decryption key is Alice's credential. There are three key properties in a hidden credential system: (1) Protection of Alice's sensitive credentials. Bob never sees Alice's credential and never knows whether Alice can access the resource. (2) Protection of Bob's sensitive policies. When Bob encrypts his resource that Alice needs, Alice can decrypt it if her credential matches one of Bob's policies. If not, she will learn nothing about Bob's resource (3) Protection of Bob's sensitive resources. The encrypted resource is not usable if one does not have the right credential; therefore, the resources are hidden safely.
Related Work and Analysis
Based on Boneh-Franklin's IBE [1] , Holt et al introduced the notion of hidden credentials [2] . They gave a formal description of hidden credentials and gave an application of hidden credentials. Frikken et al later improved computational efficiency of hidden credential decryption and enhanced security with a secret splitting scheme [9] .
The existing schemes of hidden credentials can protect privacy of both Alice and Bob. Assuming that Bob does not grant access to services but resources, Bob never knows whether Alice can access to resources she requested. Frikken et al showed this drawback in [4] . In practice, the server could grant access to services rather than resources. It means that the server determines whether a client can access to a resource or not but doesn't transmit the resource to the client directly.
In hidden credentials, Alice can protect her credentials and Bob can protect his policies. However, it could be the case that Alice would only learn part of policies if she had decrypted the ciphertext from Bob. In [4] , the situation is improved that Alice cannot learn Bob's credentials and policies and Bob can not learn Alice's credentials and policies (in the case of mutual negotiation). Furthermore, Alice can not learn any policy even if she has accessed the resource, because which credential satisfies which Bob's policy is indistinguishable to her.
Although the scheme in [4] offers better privacy protection than the other schemes of hidden credentials, we found that Alice can learn Bob's policies when she requests to access a resource repeatedly. For example, let Alice's credentials be {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 } and she can access a resource with the credentials in the first trust negotiation, but she does not know which credential satisfies Bob's policy. Then, Alice can request another access to the same resource with a subset of {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 }, if she can access the resource with {C 1 , C 2 } and {C 2 , C 3 } but not with {C 1 , C 3 }, Alice learns that the credential C 2 must satisfy Bob's policy, therefore Bob's policy leaks.
Based on the scenario that Bob grants services, there will be another private problem we have to address. If Alice can access a resource, Bob learns that her credentials satisfy his policies (does not which one). Alice's credentials can be hidden from Bob when Bob's policies are a large set. For a small set of policies, Bob will then have a better chance to guess Alice's credentials. Therefore, to mount an attack, Bob can set his policies with a lot of random strings such that they are indistinguishable to Alice. Actually, there could be only one Bob's policy matches with a credential. If Alice had accessed the resource with the correct credential, she would reveal her credential to Bob (so-called perilous policy attacks). For example, Bob can set his policies P Bob = P 1 ∨ P 2 ∨ P 3 which matches with the credential C 1 , C 2 , or C 3 , but the credentials C 2 and C 3 do not exist at all (according to Bob's setting). If Alice can access to the resource, Bob learns that Alice must possess the credential C 1 .
We found that the flaw of the schemes in [2, 9, 4 ] is due to the fact that Alice cannot verify Bob's policies. Therefore, we propose an approach of zero-knowledge proof to Bob's policies, where Alice can verify whether Bob has mounted a policy attack but knows nothing about Bob's policies.
Our Contributions
We propose a novel scheme of hidden credentials which can protect Alice's credentials from policy attacks in the following scenarios: (1) Alice's credentials can be hidden: Bob never learns her credentials accurately but only knows her credentials satisfy his policies. (2) Bob's policies can be hidden: Alice never learns his policies without right credentials but only knows part of Bob's policies which her credentials satisfy. (3) User Anonymity: Bob does not know who accesses a resource. (4) Service-oriented: Bob grants access to services and knows whether a client can access the corresponding resource or not.
Definitions and Notations
Bilinear Pairing. Let G 1 be (additive) cyclic group of prime order q. Let P, Q be a generator of
is called a bilinear pairing if this map satisfies the following properties: (1) Bilinear: for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z p , we haveê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab . (2) Non-degeneracy:ê(P, P ) = 1. In other words, if P be a generator of G 1 , thenê(P, P ) generates G 2 . (3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to computê e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
ID-Based Encryption (IBE).
Setup. Choose a random generator P ∈ G 1 . Pick a random s ∈ Z * q and set P pub = sP . Choose four cryptographic hash functions 
Encrypt. To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1}
n under the public key
Decrypt. Let U, V, W be a ciphertext encrypted using the public key ID. If U ∈ G our paper, we use P i to denote a policy and C i a corresponding credential.
Simple Policy. A simple policy consists of a set of attributes. For example, an attribute could be "president" or "dean". If a resource is encrypted with a simple policy, the ciphertext can be decrypted with an associated credential matching the policy.
Complex Policy. A complex policy consists of multiple simple policies with monotonic Boolean function ∨ and ∧. For example, A complex policy could be defined as P Bob = P 1 ∨(P 2 ∧P 3 )∨(P 4 ∧P 5 ). In order to access Bob's resources, Alice's credentials must include {C 1 }, {C 2 , C 3 }, or {C 4 , C 5 }, which match Bob's policies. For example, if Alice has credentials {C 1 , C 2 }, she will be granted with access to the corresponding resource, but rejected if she only has credentials {C 2 , C 4 }.
One-Time Password (OTP).
The OTP is randomly chosen by Bob and can be used only once. If a client requests to access a resource, Bob will randomly choose a OTP encrypted with his policies. If the client can send the OTP back to Bob, the client is granted with an access to the resource.
Simple Encryption (SE). The ciphertext of SE is the tuple:
, H 4 (σ) ⊕ M where P gene is a generator of G 1 and M is a message that contains OTP. The ciphertext is encrypted with policy P i and can only be decrypted with C i . So, if Bob's policy is P Bob = P president , Alice will reveal her credential C president when she can decrypt the ciphertext.
Complex Encryption (CE).
For P Bob = (P 1 ∧ P 2 ) ∨ P 3 ∨ P 4 , the ciphertext of CE is the tuple:
M is encrypted with diversity of policies and can be decrypted with diversity of credentials too. The difference between SE and CE is that r in later is not set by r = H 3 (σ, M ) but randomly chosen by Bob [9] .
In CE, Alice decrypts M from one of V i , therefore her credentials are indistinguishable to Bob if he encrypted OTP honestly. However, in practice Bob must be able to prove security against a policy attack.
Trust Parameters (TP).
Each TP has a parameter and a signature which can prove that the policy in the parameter is valid. The parameter is set by g
r0 , where r 0 is secretly chosen by Bob; the signature is set by Sgn(H 2 (g r0 Pi )). We denote by T P (P i , r 0 ) the parameter and signature of policy P i with r 0 . So, if Bob shows T P (P i , r 0 ) to Alice, she will learn nothing but the policy is valid (see section 5 for detail analysis).
Notations. Denote by PKG the trust third party who sets all policies P PKG and issues all credentials and TP. Denote by D Sgn the public key which can verify TP. For example, if Bob shows T P (P i , r 0 ) to Alice, she can verify
Denote by σ * a fix bit and σ * = 1 t for some constant t. It is used to help Alice make a judgement of correct decryption. Denote by R Bob an OTP randomly chosen by Bob. Denote by S TP the intersection of two sets. One is computed by Bob through his policies, the other is computed by Alice through TP. Denote by N Alice the minimum numbers of valid policies, in which Alice can ensure that her credentials are indistinguishable to Bob.
Our Scheme
In this section, we present our novel scheme that is secure against the policy attack. Parameter Phase: PKG broadcasts the params to all users. params = q,
The params is the same as in the IBE. In addition, we pick σ * = 1 t and a public key D Sgn for verifying TP. The user transmits his/her identity credential and P i to the PKG in security. The PKG verifies the credential and P i . If the user qualifies to possess C i , the PKG computes
Pi and transmits C i to the user.
Trust Parameters:
Bob computes r 0 P pub and transmits r 0 P pub , P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P k to the PKG, where P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P k are Bob's policies.
The PKG checks P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P k ? ∈ P P KG . If P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P k are valid, the PKG computes T P (P i , r 0 ), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} and transmits them to Bob.
Request:
Alice makes an access "request" to Bob. If Bob's policies are
n−t and set the σ with
Alice receives the ciphertext
and output M as the decryption of the HC E (P Bob ); else go to (2) 
If Alice cannot output M as decryption of HC E (P Bob ), she has to stop negotiation. Bob then is unable to receive R Bob from Alice and stops negotiation. Consequently, Al-ice fails to access to the resource; otherwise, Alice continues the verification process.
Alice does the following: Verifyê(Q Pi , P pub ) r0 , i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} are valid with T P (P i , r 0 ) and D P KG . Compute ê(Q Pi , P pub ) r0 r , i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} with r. Com-
Compute the intersection of two sets: Response Phase: Alice gets R Bob from M and transmit it to Bob. Bob checks whether R Bob is correct or not. If not, Bob will reject Alice from accessing the resource, else she is granted with the corresponding resource.
With no decryption effort at all, any client(without credentials) knows how many policies in HC E (P Bob ) from
Bob can use dummy policy to hide his policies. For instance, if P Bob = P 1 ∨ P 2 , he can encrypt HC E (P Bob ) with P Bob = P 1 ∨ P 2 ∨ P * 3 ∨ P * 4 where P * i are not exist at all.
Trust Parameters can be used repeatedly. The policy in T P (P i , r 0 ) is hidden from Alice (we will analyse it in section 5). So, Bob can get TP from the PKG only once and use it repeatedly.
Security Analysis
We present three computational hard problems here on which the security of IBE and our scheme is based.
(1) Discrete Logarithm Problem (DL). Given two elements P, Q ∈ G 1 ,find an integer α ∈ Z * q such that Q = αP whenever such an integer exists.
(2) Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH). Given P, aP, bP for some unknown a, b ∈ Z * q where P is a generator of G 1 , compute abP .
(3) Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDH). Given P, aP, bP, cP for some unknown a, b, c ∈ Z * q where P is a generator of G 1 , compute W =ê(P, P ) abc ∈ G 2 .
Bob's policies are hidden from Alice. Even if Alice can decrypt the HC E (P Bob ) with C m and knows that P m ∈ P Bob and P m ∈ T P (P i , r 0 ). Let g =ê(Q Pm , P pub ) and h =ê(Q Pm , P pub ) r0 , the CDH problem holds. So r 0 is hidden to Alice.
For {P, Q Ps , P pub , r 0 P } (P s is a policy supposed by Alice), the BDH problem holds. So, Alice cannot computê e(Q Ps , P pub ) r0 and verify g r0 Ps
?
∈ TP.
With σ and r, Alice can verify σ ⊕ H 2 (g rr0 Ps )
? ∈ {V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , · · · , V k } iff she can compute g r0 Ps . From the above, We know that Alice will fail to verify. Our scheme is secure against Bob's policy attacks (Alice's credentials are hidden from Bob). In our scheme, how many policies are valid in HC E (P Bob ) can be learned from S T P , which is computed by TP. Because Bob cannot get TP of dummy policy, then it is impossible for Bob to mount an attack from policies. Alice's credentials are hidden from Bob for that she can learn S T P and decides to continue or not.
Because of the space restriction, we will provide security proofs in the full version of this paper.
